Bangladesh to halt the intake of Rohingya Muslims fleeing from Myanmar: Not for lack of empathy, but for National Security.

Introduction

According to BBC News sources, Bangladesh has informed the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) that it cannot accept any more Rohingya refugees into its borders; however, the refusal is not because of discrimination nor lack of empathy but rather the growing escalation of violence, terrorism and economic strain that is creating a national security crisis within Bangladesh (BBC News, 2019). Since 2016, Bangladesh has generously hosted many Rohingya refugees in camps, more than 740,000 as of 2017. In 2018, Bangladesh and Myanmar agreed to restart a repatriation process, where Myanmar was to accept 1,500 displaced Rohingya per week over two years; however, the Myanmar government has failed to meet its obligation by failing to work with humanitarian aid organisations and the failure to recognise the rights of the Rohingya people as citizens of Myanmar (Rahman, 2023).

This article discusses the crisis facing the Rohingya refugees and the nation hosting these displaced people, Bangladesh. This article will first provide a timeline of events that led to the exodus of the Muslim minority from Myanmar. Secondly, look through the lens of the host nation, Bangladesh, its acceptance of the refugees, its rights and responsibilities, and the security issues it now faces within its borders. Thirdly, it will detail why the repatriation processes have failed and why the Rohingya remain a stateless minority. Lastly, it concludes that the fault lies not with Bangladesh but with the Myanmar government, that have relentlessly committed human rights violations against the Rohingya Muslims and has countless times failed to negotiate or cooperate with humanitarian organisations, the UN (United Nations) and the Bangladesh government, by an unwillingness to restore the rights and safety of this displaced people.

The Exodus of the Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar

According to National Geographic, the Rohingya people have a long history dating back thousands of years when they established settlements in Arakan State, renamed Burma during the British colonisation in 1824, and again renamed Myanmar 124 years later when it gained independence from British occupation. In 1982, Myanmar passed a law of citizenship that denied the Rohingya population citizenship, thus becoming a stateless people (Blakemore, 2019). The beginning of the mass exodus started when, in 2010, Myanmar reconfigured its political framework to include Rohingya leaders; instead of creating a path towards inclusion, equality, and acceptance, it created a great divide between the Rohingya Muslim and the Rakhine Buddhist population (Simpson & Farrelly, 2020). By 2012, the Buddhist extremist groups, 962 movements, and the Ma Ba Tha had begun to target Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine state, citing that they had become an existential threat to the Buddhist community, the majority ethnicity in Myanmar (Subedi & Garnett, 2020, p.223).

By 2017, the Myanmar military and Buddhist extremist groups began a vicious campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya Muslim community (Human Rights Watch, 2022). According to an International State Crime Initiative (ISCI) 2018 Report, 75 Percent of the villages that the Rohingya once occupied have been bulldozed, yet while an estimated 22,000 Rohingya have been executed, between 150-200 thousand are kept in concentration camps, prisoner villages or ghettos, while approximately 800,000 have fled to Bangladesh (ISCI 2018). However, the increasing number of refugees entering Bangladesh is creating a food security crisis on top of violent protests.

From Myanmar to Bangladesh

Bangladesh has generously opened its borders to a large number of displaced Rohingya refugees; however, hosting such a large population has become somewhat of a burden as it gives rise to violent protests and new threats from terrorist organisations from within its borders, as well as creating an economic crisis (Hammerstad, 2014). In accepting the Rohingya refugees, the Bangladesh government is responsible for housing, feeding, and protecting those allowed safe passage into its borders. Some scholars argue that the Bangladesh government refers to the Rohingyas as ‘refugees’ as a political strategy to avoid pressure from the international community to provide legal status under international law (Bari, 2020), thereby affording some protection to Bangladesh over the vulnerability of its guests. However, Bangladesh must uphold citizens’ and refugees’ international human rights laws (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

In 2017, the Bangladesh government stated it could provide food security to up to 700,000 refugees (Hutchinson, 2018), which means it is already at capacity; therefore, allowing any more refugees into its borders not only threatens the food security of the refugees being hosted, but it also threatens the security of the Bangladesh citizens themselves, thus creating a more significant security threat. The underlying obstacle facing Bangladesh, the UN, and many of the humanitarian organisations that are assisting in this human security crisis is the lack of commitment by the Myanmar government to not only repatriate the Rohingya community back to their homeland but to ensure they regain their identity.

Myanmar: refusal to humanise the Rohingya Muslim Minority

While the continued violence perpetrated against the Rohingya population started long before the exodus in 2016, recent events have highlighted the unwillingness of the Myanmar government to accept the Muslim minority as citizens of the state (BBC News, 2018). Although in 2018, Myanmar agreed to accept 1,500 Rohingya per week over two years, they have failed to commit to the agreement, and while one can argue that slow progress can be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic, the agreement came one year prior; therefore, the pandemic cannot be the reason for broken promises.

While Bangladesh is eager to repatriate refugees, it is also obligated to ensure the safety and survival of those repatriated under the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) article that implies if a population is at risk of mass atrocities (Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing) by its native state, a host nation is obligated to protect the safety of those under its guardianship (Nanlohy, 2022). Myanmar has not assured that those willing to return will not be marked for death. In an interview between Myanmar leader Suu Kyi and Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein (UN Watchdog for Human Rights), the Myanmar leader failed to refer to the Rohingya by name, which was another attempt to dehumanise them (BBC News, 2017; Rowlatt, 2017), showing the unwillingness of Myanmar to accept the Rohingya minority as individuals who have rights, this also explains why many Rohingyas are apprehensive or unwilling to return to their homeland.

Myanmar’s refusal to accept Rohingyas as citizens means these refugees remain stateless, and if repatriation were to go forward, these individuals would not be afforded the rights to essentials to sustain life, including health security; moreover, Rohingyas would be perceived as illegals and criminals (Martin, 2021). Moving forward, even if Myanmar agreed to recognise Rohingyas as part of their national identity, thus removing their stateless label, this move alone would not ensure the survival of Rohingya Muslims (Vlieks et al., 2017). It would also require Myanmar to protect Rohingyas from all forms of violence, including threats from the Buddhist majority and Myanmar’s military forces, which it is unwilling to commit to at this point.

Conclusion

All things considered, Bangladesh has done its best to accommodate those Rohingya refugees within its border; although there have been incidents where refugees have been subject to abuses and violent outbreaks, Bangladesh is at its total capacity; it is not that Bangladesh is unsympathetic towards the Rohingya plight, rather the strain of maintaining such a high intake of refugees is putting Bangladesh’s own environmental and health security at risk. The repatriation failures lay with the Myanmar government, which refused to accept Rohingyas as part of their national identity. Secondly, Myanmar failed to work with Bangladesh, the UN, and humanitarian agencies to ensure the restoration of full human rights to the Rohingyas, and lastly, it failed to provide human security and safety for the Rohingya minority once repatriated. Therefore, the onus is on Myanmar to follow through with its promises, starting with reinstating the Rohingyas’ national identity as Myanmar citizens; until then, the Rohingya crisis will remain a transnational security cross-border threat.

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